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1. Introduction 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 are the most 
important events of the late 20
th
 century. Few observers foresaw these events. As late as in 
February 1989 fugitives trying to escape Eastern Germany were shot. In December 1990, 
when I was in Tallinn, Estonia, I discussed the situation in the Soviet Union with someone 
who had been correspondent in Moscow for a Swedish newspaper for over ten years. Thus, he 
knew the Soviet Union very well. Yet, he believed that the Baltics would not be able to secede 
from the Soviet Union, certainly not before the turn of the century. Only nine months later, 
however, this was exactly what happened after the failed coupe of August 1991. The Soviet 
Union collapsed and the Baltics regained their independence. This illustrates that predictions 
are very difficult to make even for those who are well informed.
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 In this paper I will not make predictions. However, I will not ignore the future either. I 
will focus on the current situation with regard to globalization from a historical perspective, 
while I will also look at possible future developments. The term globalization appeared in a 
dictionary for the first time in 1961, but the concept of globalization is not always clear (Ro-
drik, 2001). In the literature concepts of globalization can be found that sometimes seem 
fuzzy. According to Levitt (1993) a global corporation “operates (…) as if the entire world (or 
major regions of it) were a single entity; it sells the same things in the same way everywhere”. 
This seems to describe a problem of a number of US companies operating in foreign markets 
rather than to define the concept of globalization in a meaningful way. Some US companies 
try to sell products that were developed for the home market in foreign markets. This is a far 
different approach compared to many Japanese companies, which develop products for for-
eign markets and try to sell them in these markets. An example is the Lexus, a car that is 
widely sold in the US market. 
 Emotional feelings seem sometimes more important than facts and rational arguments. 
When interviewed demonstrators against globalization do not always appear able to provide a 
meaningful definition. At the G8 meetings in Genoa in July 2001 a variety of protest groups 
marched on the streets to protest against globalization. Protesters also voice their opinions on 
the Internet.
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 They seem to have some influence on official institutions as well as companies. 
The next G8 meeting will most likely be held in some remote place. World Bank development 
projects have been abandoned. Starbucks has promised to sell “fair trade” coffee beans in its 
coffee shops. Clothing importers in the USA settled after they had been sued over working 
conditions in the American commonwealth of Saipan in the Pacific. The Internet has proved 
an important tool in organizing protest groups, which seem to have globalized faster than their 
target enterprises. However, a crucial question is who elected them? The governments they 
fight are in the end accountable to voters, but who holds the protest groups accountable? 
Globalization is sometimes used as synonymous to internationalization, which could 
be interpreted as increasing international interdependence. Globalization is also defined as a 
                                               
1
 According to Rodrik (2001) economists rank second to astrologers in their predictive abilities. 
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 One example is www.destroyimf.org advertising itself as “a web resource for all those mobilising to end the 
poverty and injustice inflicted by global capitalism”. As the spelling suggests the movement seems to be orga-
nized by European activists. 
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development towards relations acquiring relatively distanceless and borderless qualities 
(Scholte, 1997). I interpret globalization as economic integration of countries in the world 
economy on the basis of open markets and free movement of goods, services, workers, and 
capital. This implies that products are sold across countries irrespective of distances and bor-
ders between the various outlets. Global products comprise a wide range of products includ-
ing food (e.g., Kellogg's cereals), beverages (e.g., Coca-Cola), stimulants (e.g., Marlboro cig-
arettes), clothes (e.g., Levi's jeans), pharmaceuticals (e.g., Bayer aspirin), music recordings 
(e.g., Madonna), office equipment (e.g., Xerox copiers), transport vehicles (e.g., Ford), and 
travel services (e.g., Holiday Inn). However, this is a qualitative characterization rather than a 
quantitative and precise account of global products. The role of governments is limited with 
regard to this concept of globalization. 
Market principles have gained popularity in the last decades of the 20
th
 century. In 
western countries this occurred in the 1980s. Leading politicians including President Reagan 
in the USA and prime minister Thatcher in the UK heavily emphasized the market as the or-
ganizing principle. Privatization became a key word. In the 1990s, market principles also 
gained popularity in developing countries and former communist countries. After the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War profound changes occurred in Central and 
Eastern European societies. A major shift from principles of planning and control to market 
principles could be observed. The omnipresent fist of the centrally planned economy was re-
placed with the invisible hand of the market economy in a relatively short period of time. The 
economic consequences of these upheavals proved to be very large. In the 1990s, GDP in 
Central and Eastern European countries fell dramatically. In 2000, real GDP in the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) - the former Soviet republics except the three Baltic states 
- amounted to 55 per cent of its 1989 level. In the former East bloc - Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, the Baltics and the CIS - this figure amounted to 68 per cent (EBRD, 2000). Given the 
notorious allocative inefficiency of the centrally planned economies in Central and Eastern 
Europe, however, a fall of real GDP is not identical to a decline in the standard of living. A 
decrease of the production of weapons and barbed wire does not necessarily reduce the wel-
fare of individuals. Nonetheless, the transition from centrally planned to market economies 
has proved to be painful. 
 
2. Globalization over time 
 
Over time the world economy has greatly benefited from globalization. Economic theory ex-
plains that mutual gains can result from international trade if there are comparative advantag-
es in the production of goods between nations. Dutch experience from 1850 to the end of the 
Napoleonic wars provides a dramatic demonstration of the way in which Western Europe in-
teracted with the world economy in that epoch. In the mid-18
th
 century Britain removed all 
trade and tariff restrictions unilaterally. In 1860 it had concluded reciprocal treaties for freer 
trade with France and other European countries, which had most-favored nation clauses 
(Maddison, 2001). Historically, the first half of the 20
th
 century was an interruption of the 
move towards free trade. World War I shattered the old liberal order and international trade 
collapsed. This was a result of increasing protectionism during the Great Depression and the 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Only after World War II the move towards free trade resumed 
giving rise to a sustained period of high economic growth. 
 Table 1 shows annual growth rates of GDP for different periods and regions. It reveals 
interesting developments. First, economic growth was indeed relatively high in 1950-1973 in 
most regions and thus also in the world. Second, in the last two centuries economic growth 
was typically higher in the USA compared to Western Europe, but the reverse was true in 
1950-1973. Third, economic growth in Eastern Europe was typically in line with that in 
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Western Europe with the exception of the period 1973-1990, when Eastern Europe lagged be-
hind. Fourth, economic growth in Japan was exceptionally high in 1950-1973, when the Japa-
nese economy grew two times as fast as the economies in the western world. Fifth, in the 19
th
 
century economic growth in Africa exceed that in Asia, but lagged behind with the western 
world. In the first half of the 20
th
 century, however, economic growth in Africa was consider-
ably higher than in Western Europe and at the same level as in the USA. In 1950-1973 eco-
nomic growth in Africa was comparable to that in the western world. In this period African 
growth exceeded somewhat economic growth in the USA, while it was only a little bit lower 
than in Europe. Sixth, economic growth in Asia was the lowest in the world until the mid-20
th
 
century. Until 1950 the annual growth rate was lower than 1 per cent, but in the post-war pe-
riod it was over 5 per cent. 
 
Table. 1. Average Annual GDP Growth Rates, 1820-1998. 
 1820-70 1870-1913 1913-50 1950-73 1973-98 
Western Europe 1.65 2.10 1.19 4.81 2.11 
Eastern Europe 1.36 2.31 1.14 4.86 0.73 
USA 4.20 3.94 2.84 3.93 2.99 
Latin America 1.37 3.48 3.43 5.33 3.02 
Japan 0.41 2.44 2.21 9.29 2.97 
Asia (excl. Japan) 0.03 0.94 0.90 5.18 5.46 
Africa 0.52 1.40 2.69 4.45 2.74 
World 0.93 2.11 1.85 4.91 3.01 
Source: Maddison (2001). 
 
 Globalization is not a new phenomenon. On the contrary, it already occurred centuries 
ago. Mussa (2000) points out that the extent of global economic integration through interna-
tional trade today is, by some key measures, not much greater than it was a century ago. 
Around 1900, however, roughly two-thirds of GDP was in the goods producing sector of the 
typical industrial country. Now that situation is reversed, and roughly two-thirds of GDP is in 
the service sector of the typical industrial country. If trade shares are measured as ratios of 
international trade of goods to the output of goods production, then those shares are soon to 
have increased significantly from a century ago. Therefore, Mussa (2000) stresses that this 
supports the view that international integration of markets for goods is significantly greater 
today than a century ago. 
The globalization process seems to have stagnated in the first half of the 20
th
 century. 
Table 2 shows that exports decreased relative to GDP in the most important industrialized 
countries (plus the Netherlands) in the first half of the 20
th
 century. Exports rose in the second 
half of the 20
th
 century. The increase in the post-war period was much larger, however, than 
the decrease between the two World Wars. In terms of exports the globalization process thus 
flourished in the second half of the 20
th
 century after a period of contraction in the first half of 
that century. Given the data in Tables 1 and 2 Williamson (1997) seems correct in his charac-
terization of the different periods. He speaks of the late 19
th
 century belle epoque, the dark 
middle years between 1914 and 1950, and the late 20
th
 century renaissance. The first and last 
epochs were characterized by rapid growth; economic convergence as poor countries caught 
up with rich ones; and globalization, marked by trade booms, mass migrations, and huge capi-
tal flows. The period 1913-1950 is associated with slow growth, a retreat from globalization, 
and economic divergence. 
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Table 2. Exports as a percentage of GDP, 1913-1998. 
 1913 1929 1950 1973 1998 
USA 3.7 3.6 3.0 4.9 10.1 
Japan 2.4 3.5 2.2 7.7 13.4 
France 7.8 8.6 7.6 15.2 28.7 
Germany 16.1 12.8 6.2 23.8 38.9 
UK 17.5 13.3 11.3 14.0 25.0 
Netherlands 17.3 17.2 12.2 40.7 61.2 
World 7.9 9.0 5.5 10.5 17.2 
Source: Maddison (2001). 
 
 History offers thus an unambiguous positive correlation between globalization and 
convergence. Williamson’s detailed analysis of the pre-World War I years leads him to the 
conclusion that the correlation seems to be causal. He concludes that globalization was the 
critical factor promoting economic convergence (Williamson, 1996). 
 Before the collapse of the Soviet Union Central and Eastern European countries 
formed an almost closed trading bloc. Trade within the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CMEA) dominated their international trade relations and only a small share of trade 
was conducted with the rest of the world. In particular the Soviet Union was a closed econo-
my with a share of trade with other CMEA countries of 90 per cent (EBRD, 1999). Exports of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were not significant. In 1913, the region's share 
in world exports was nearly the same as its share in the world population. Its share in the 
world population steadily declined, whereas its share in world exports initially increased. 
Seven years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, its share in world exports was at 
the same level as in 1913. Thus, the relative importance of Eastern Europe and the former So-
viet Union in terms of exports was equally small at the end and in the beginning of the 20
th
 
century. 
 
Table 3. Share of Eastern Europe’s exports and population in world total, 1913-1998. 
 1913 1950 1973 1998 
Exports 4.1 5.0 7.5 4.1 
Population 4.4 3.5 2.8 2.0 
Source: Madison, 2001. 
 
 Seven years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the CMEA the CIS countries 
were still to a large extent dependent on trade links with other transition countries, in particu-
lar Russia. Yet, the liberalization of external trade in the early 1990s led to a reallocation of 
trade flows away from the CMEA towards the European Union. This holds in particular for 
Estonia, the Czech Republic and Hungary, where exports to the European Union stood at 
some 50 per cent of GDP (EBRD, 2001). Trade with the rest of the world also increased, but 
by much less. Therefore, regionalization seems to reflect developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union more accurately than globalization. 
 Regionalization seems a growing trend. As of mid-2000 114 regional trade agreements 
were in effect and virtually all WTO-members are partners in at least one regional trade 
agreement. In the western hemisphere, the North American Free Trade Association links Can-
ada, Mexico, and the USA. In Europe, the European Union is linked by bilateral free-trade 
agreements to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. A number of recent regional trade 
agreements in Europe and Central Asia concern the integration of countries of the former So-
viet Union as well as with their neighbors. Both in Central and Latin America and in Asia the 
pace of conclusion of regional trade agreements continues to be rapid. Also in Africa and the 
 5 
Middle East regional trade agreements are growing (WTO, 2001). This growing trend of re-
gionalization may give rise to a tripolar view of the world, with the USA, Japan and the Euro-
pean Union being the three poles. However, trade groupings are not always stable in the long 
run. The system of British Commonwealth Preferences and the COMECON, for example, 
have collapsed, while some regional trade groupings in Africa and the Caribbean have col-
lapsed or merged with others (Lloyd, 1992). Moreover, the European Union is the only region 
where the share of intra-regional merchandise trade exceeds 50 per cent. Thus, with a share of 
intra-regional trade of 69 per cent trade among European Union member states trade within 
the European Union is more important than trade between the European Union and the rest of 
the world. In Asia the share of intra-regional trade amounts to 47 per cent and in North Amer-
ica 40 per cent (WTO 2000). Asia and North America are thus to a lesser extent closed econ-
omies than the European Union. 
 
3. Scenarios for further globalization 
 
One may look into the future without making any predictions by describing how develop-
ments in future could be. This is the scenario approach. The Central Planning Bureau (1999) 
has identified four scenarios that address the globalization process in various ways. For that 
purpose it has used WorldScan, an applied general equilibrium model for the world economy 
focusing on economic growth in the long run and trade patterns between 12 regions.
3
 
 The first scenario identified is the Schumpeterian World, which is optimistic on eco-
nomic progress and developing regions. It emphasizes globalization tendencies and market-
oriented policies in the world economy. It is based on the idea that when developing countries 
grow fast the linkages between OECD and non-OECD countries intensify. OECD countries 
specialize relatively more in high-skilled labor-intensive goods such as capital goods and ser-
vices, whereas non-OECD countries specialize in consumer goods that are low-skilled labor 
intensive. Rapid development outside the OECD area and complete liberalization of goods 
and capital markets produce closer economic integration of rich and poor countries. The non-
OECD share in world production increases from 23 per cent in 1995 to 42 per cent in 2020, 
while the ratio of trade to GDP nearly doubles. Liberalization of goods, services and capital 
allows countries to specialize, exploit economies of scale, and create competition. Moreover, 
open markets encourage dissemination of modern technologies in developing regions. Tech-
nology is particularly important for transition countries to help restructure their inefficient 
production processes inherited from the communist past. 
 The second scenario is the Malthusian scenario. It assumes that developing regions are 
unable to pursue market- and outward-oriented policies. The political situation is unstable and 
leads to an inward-looking attitude. The lack of trade liberalization and neglect of infrastruc-
ture and education hurts economic growth substantially in these regions. In this scenario, 
people in developing regions tend to migrate to the OECD area and the trend towards globali-
zation is reversed. Despite the unfavorable market circumstances in non-OECD countries 
their growth rates exceed those in the OECD area. This reflects the enormous potential of 
these countries. However, the non-OECD share in world production shows only a modest in-
crease to 28 per cent in 2020. The trade restrictions imposed by non-OECD countries hamper 
trade significantly and the ratio of trade to GDP lowers in these countries. Japan and Western 
Europe reinforce their positions in the production of intermediate goods, while all OECD 
countries can maintain their position in the production of consumer goods. Most developing 
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 These regions are the USA, Western Europe, Japan, Rest of the OECD, Eastern Europe, Former Soviet Union, 
Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, China, South East Asia, and South Asia & 
Rest. 
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regions lose the opportunities to export agricultural goods to the OECD. China shifts to the 
production of consumer goods, because it faces less competition from its Asian neighbors. 
 The third scenario that the Central Planning Bureau (1999) identifies is the Developing 
scenario, which is less rosy than the first two scenarios. Growth perspectives for OECD coun-
tries are bleak, while non-OECD countries grow fast at high environmental costs. The lack of 
flexibility on the labor and product markets within the OECD keeps unemployment levels 
high and economic crises inside the OECD strengthen protectionist sentiments. Disagreement 
on free trade issues on agriculture and services between the USA, the European Union and 
Japan withholds all globalization tendencies in the OECD. Producers reduce investment, curb 
research and development, and technological progress slows down. The developing countries 
do not face these problems. They really catch up with the developed countries. Their policies 
are outward oriented and they go further in opening up and strengthening their markets, there-
by creating their own trade blocs. They invest in infrastructure and education and copy at a 
fast pace technologies from the OECD countries. The non-OECD share in world production 
doubles to nearly 50 per cent As in the Schumpeterian scenario, the transition countries have 
to rely on technical progress, which pushes up economic growth substantially. The other re-
gions also benefit from the increase in labor productivity by schooling and labor reallocation. 
 The fourth scenario is the Ecological scenario, in which producers and consumers val-
ue environmental quality and put less emphasis on economic growth. People value the con-
sumption of local products of their own culture. Globalization is thus not important in this re-
spect and there are few incentives to eliminate trade barriers. The main reason for low eco-
nomic growth is the lack of technological progress. The trade to GDP ratio hardly increases in 
the OECD area and remains constant in the non-OECD countries. Most of the production con-
tinues to occur in the OECD area and the shift to non-OECD regions is modest. The Ecologi-
cal scenario differs from the other scenarios in that the rise in demand for energy is very mod-
est. As a result, the total emissions of CO2 are about 40 per cent lower than in the Developing 
scenario. Emissions in the OECD area do not even increase. The OECD and transition coun-
tries agree to reduce the emissions according to the Kyoto protocol, while the non-OECD 
countries limit the growth of energy demand by energy-efficiency improvements in produc-
tion and a reduction in consumer demand. Curbed demand for energy hurts the energy-
exporting regions. The share of energy in total exports by the Middle East and North Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union declines significantly. They diversify their 
exports to capital goods, services, and intermediate goods. The traditional exporters of agri-
cultural goods, the USA and the Rest of the OECD, improve their positions in this sector in 
response to the partial trade liberalization. Asian regions now dominate the market for con-
sumer goods. They specialize in these goods because of the relative abundant supply of low-
skilled labor. The shift in the export mix is possible due to a shift of low-skilled labor from 
agriculture to consumer goods. The former Soviet Union is the biggest loser in this sector and 
its export share vanishes. 
 The outcomes of the scenarios differ because different assumptions underlie the driv-
ing forces. Table 4 compares a selection of the exogenous trends and variables that the Cen-
tral Planning Bureau (1999) has assumed. Technical progress is one of the most important 
driving forces for economic growth. If its pace is high, economies grow fast, like in the 
Schumpeterian and the Developing scenarios for the non-OECD countries. Most scenarios 
combine economic growth with increased international linkages and, consequently, trade libe-
ralization. Tariff reductions in agriculture and raw materials are limited to 50 per cent at the 
most, because these levels are very high for some regions and much less progress has so far 
been made in lowering these barriers. Even in the Ecological scenario some trade liberaliza-
tion occurs because regions are willing to cooperate in the field of environmental policy. 
Since in this scenario they are less interested in globalization, however, trade liberalization 
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remains limited. The Schumpeterian scenario also features increasing capital market integra-
tion, while the extent of competition is assumed to be larger than in the other scenarios. In all 
scenarios with high economic growth sustainable production is only possible if energy-
efficient technologies are introduced. Therefore, OECD countries save 0.5 per cent annually 
on energy per unit of production in the Schumpeterian and Malthusian scenarios. Non-OECD 
countries even save 1.0 per cent in the Schumpeterian scenario. In the Ecological scenario the 
environmental awareness of non-OECD countries is much higher. As a result, the energy sav-
ing amounts to 2 per cent per year with much lower dissemination of technology from the 
OECD countries. OECD countries save less in the Ecological scenario because technical 
progress is slow, which makes it more difficult to implement energy-saving technologies. The 
reduction in energy demand is realized by introducing energy taxes that the OECD countries 
impose according to the Kyoto protocol. They even agree to reduce the emissions further by 1 
per cent per year after 2010. In the Ecological scenario industrial and transition countries can 
trade in emission rights in order to realize the emission targets. The other non-OECD coun-
tries do not participate because the OECD and transition countries are mainly responsible for 
the abatement. 
 
Table 4. Exogenous trends in the scenarios until 2020 (in %). 
Scenario 
Region 
Schumpeterian 
     O
a
           N
a
 
Malthusian 
    O       N 
Developing 
   O        N 
Ecological 
   O        N 
Technical progress (annual)     1.5     2.0     1.2 0.7 0.6    2.0   0.6   0.9 
Trade liberalization in manu-
facturing and services 
100 100 100 0 0 100 50 50 
Trade liberalization in raw ma-
terials and agriculture 
  50   50   50 0 0 50 25 25 
Capital market integration Increasing stable stable stable 
Degree of competition High standard standard standard 
Energy efficiency     0.5     1.0    0.5 0.0 0.0    0.0   0.0   2.0 
a. O = OECD; N = non-OECD. 
Source: Central Planning Bureau (1999). 
 
 The use of different exogenous trends used in the various scenarios implies a wide 
variation in the results. Rapid technological progress raises economic growth, as is the case in 
the Schumpeterian and the Developing scenarios for the non-OECD countries. Table 5 shows 
that in high-growth scenarios GDP growth per capita is about 2 per cent in OECD countries 
and 6 per cent in non-OECD regions. High economic growth leads to high savings rates. Sav-
ings rates in the OECD area are generally lower than in non-OECD regions. High GDP 
growth also changes consumption patterns. Consumers in OECD countries spend relatively 
more on services. The share of food in total consumption in OECD regions is already low in 
1995 (10 per cent). Therefore, the differences in the shares of food consumption in the differ-
ent scenarios are small within the OECD area and range from 6.5 to 7.7 per cent. In non-
OECD regions, however, these differences are considerably larger. The share of food con-
sumption drastically declines from 26 per cent in 1995 to 12.6 or 16.7 per cent in 2020 de-
pending on GDP growth in the scenarios. The share of consumption of services increases 
from 54 per cent in 1995 to 64.8 or 70.6 per cent in 2020. 
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Table 5. Summary of scenario results until 2020. 
Scenario 
Region 
Schumpeterian 
       O
a
         N
a 
Malthusian 
      O         N 
Developing 
      O         N 
Ecological 
      O        N 
                                                              Average annual growth between 1995 and 2020 
GDP 2.6 6.2 2.6 3.6 1.2 5.9 1.2 4.0 
GDP per capita 2.2 4.7 1.7 2.2 0.8 4.4 0.9 2.5 
Real producer prices energy 1.5 0.3 0.7 0.2 1.6 - 0.1 0.7 0.0 
Emissions 0.8 3.6 1.1 2.8 0.3 4.6 0.0 1.4 
                                                                                          Ratios in 2020 
Labor reallocation as % of 
labor supply 
 19.1  7.9  18.1  14.5 
Savings rate 17.8 23.5 17.9 16.6 14.7 24.4 14.9 18.9 
Spending on services 77.9 70.6 77.2 65.2 75.7 68.6 75.6 64.8 
Spending on agriculture 6.5 12.6 7.1 17.0 7.6 13.4 7.7 16.7 
Trade to GDP 22.9 43.6 12.5 22.6 15.0 25.5 14.6 24.7 
a. O = OECD; N = non-OECD. 
Source: Central Planning Bureau (1999). 
 
 Trade only flourishes if all countries reduce their trade barriers. Since OECD countries 
are endowed with high-skilled labor and capital and non-OECD countries are endowed with 
low-skilled labor, specialization will increase if trade barriers between these regions are re-
duced or eliminated. This occurs in the Schumpeterian scenario. OECD countries have similar 
endowments of high-skilled labor and capital, while non-OECD countries have similar en-
dowments of low-skilled labor. Specialization within the OECD and non-OECD regions will 
thus be less pronounced than between OECD and non-OECD countries given the level of ag-
gregation in the model. Therefore, the trade to GDP ratios are fairly low in the Malthusian and 
Developing and also the Ecological scenarios. The high trade to GDP ratio in the Schumpete-
rian scenario depends on trade liberalization and the degree of international competition. 
 High economic growth harms the environment. In the Schumpeterian and Malthusian 
scenarios emissions grow substantially but do not accelerate, due to energy-saving technolo-
gies. In the Ecological scenario demand for energy is stable due to strict environmental legis-
lation in the OECD area. As a result, the global increase in CO2 emissions is about 20 per 
cent, which seems very modest given the economic development in non-OECD regions. 
Moreover, at the end of the scenario period emissions do not increase at all. In the Developing 
scenario growth of emissions does accelerate due to rapid growth in developing regions, 
which ignore environmental quality. As a result, emissions double in the scenario period. If 
energy growth is not allowed for at all, economic growth has to be low - as in the Ecological 
scenario - or a more strict environmental legislation is necessary. The differences in emission 
growth in the non-ecological scenarios are not very pronounced. In these scenarios emissions 
grow substantially. Whether this growth is sustainable or not is hard to say. First, the quant ita-
tive effects of pollution on the environment are unclear. Second, simulation paths of 25 years 
are relatively short to analyze emission paths. 
 
4. Summary 
 
Globalization is not a new phenomenon, but already occurred centuries ago. The first half of 
the 20
th
 century seems an interruption of the move towards free trade. After World War II, 
however, the move to free trade resumed and gave rise to a sustained period of high economic 
growth in most parts of the world. Central and Eastern Europe was an exception because this 
region formed an almost closed trading bloc. Though CIS countries are still to a large extent 
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dependent on Russia, liberalization of external trade in the early 1990s led to a reallocation of 
trade flows away from Central and Eastern Europe towards the European Union. 
 The Central Planning Bureau (1999) has explored possible future developments by apply-
ing a general equilibrium model for the world economy. It has identified four scenarios: 
1. The Schumpeterian World, a scenario that is optimistic on economic progress and develop-
ing regions emphasizing globalization tendencies and market-oriented policies in the 
world economy. 
2. The Malthusian scenario, which assumes that developing regions are unable to pursue 
market- and outward-oriented policies. 
3. The Developing scenario assuming bleak growth perspectives for the OECD area, but 
high growth in non-OECD countries at high environmental costs. 
4. The Ecological scenario, in which producers and consumers value environmental quality 
and put less emphasis on economic growth. 
Because of the differences in underlying assumptions the scenarios produce different 
outcomes. The results are not predictions, but descriptions of possible future developments on 
the basis of an applied general equilibrium model of the world economy and various exogen-
ous trends that have been assumed. There seems considerable scope for CIS countries to inte-
grate in the world economy. Continued globalization may further economic growth, while 
high economic growth harms the environment. However, energy-saving technologies and en-
vironmental legislation may affect the outcomes. 
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